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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, I reflect about a recent regulatory trend concerning the enforcement of labour standards 
through contract compliance clauses and other requirements of public contracts tendered under 
European Union public procurement law. On the back of recent developments in the case law of the 
European Court of Justice regarding cross-border situations of procurement-based enforcement of 
labour standards, notably in the re-examination of the Rüffert case in both the Bundesdruckerei and 
RegioPost cases, I reflect on this phenomenon from the perspective of regulatory substitution. In 
setting out a basic framework to assess regulatory substitution, I hypothesise that most of the 
difficulties evidenced by the case law stem from the transfer of labour regulation goals to the public 
procurement sphere. I then aim to test this hypothesis by means of an analysis of labour policy-
oriented mechanisms included in the 2014 revision of the EU public procurement rules. I then go on 
to critically assess the fitness for purpose of the procurement mechanisms from the perspective of 
contributing to the enforcement of labour standards. I ultimately conclude that, even though the 2014 
Public Procurement Package has galvanised the trend of regulatory substitution whereby employment 
and social goals have now become part and parcel of public procurement strategy in the EU, a close 
examination of the legal mechanisms created by Directive 2014/24/EU shows that this regulatory 
substitution is both limited and highly dependent on the implementation (and investment of 
significant administrative resources) at Member State level. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, I reflect about a recent regulatory trend concerning the enforcement of labour standards 
through contract compliance clauses and other requirements of public contracts tendered under 
European Union public procurement law.2 The use of public contracts for the enforcement of labour 
standards in situations of quasi-public sector employment, or as a tool to promote compliance with 
labour law more generally, has been a sticky regulatory issue in the European Union.3 Many EU 
countries use the leverage of public expenditure to either impose labour conditions for the benefit of 
those involved in the provision of services to the public sector—ie as an extension of their duties of 
good employer—or to leverage the enforcement of labour standards against companies interested in 
public sector business—in discharge of more general duties of labour market regulation.4 This can be 
seen as the EU’s current approach to strategic procurement,5 and as an integral part of the Europe 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.6 
This trend is creating difficulties in the context of the regulation of the EU’s internal market.7 
In particular, such instrumental use of public procurement as a tool of labour policy has raised 
difficulties in cross-border situations where bidders from outside the relevant labour jurisdiction have 
felt disadvantaged due to the obligation to meet higher labour law standards than in their home 
jurisdiction. This fleshes out the difficulties derived from the inability of the EU Member States to 
                                                          
2 This is currently regulated by the 2014 Public Procurement Package, including a directive on public 
procurement (Dir 2014/24/EU), a directive on utilities procurement (Dir 2014/24/25) and a directive on 
concession contracts (Dir 2014/23/EU). For details, see the page of the European Commission: 
https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/public-procurement/rules-implementation_en.  
3 For a view on the reignition of the discussion last decade, see C McCrudden, ‘Using public procurement to 
achieve social outcomes’ (2004) 28 Natural Resources Forum 257-267, and later more fully developed in C 
McCrudden, Buying Social Justice. Equality, Government Procurement & Legal Change (Oxford University Press, 
2007). See also ACL Davies, The Public Law of Government Contracts (Oxford University Press, 2008) 260-296; S 
Arrowsmith and P Kunzlik (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law. New Directives and 
New Directions (Cambridge University Press, 2009); B Bercusson and N Bruun, ‘Labour Law Aspects of Public 
Procurement in the EU’ in R Nielsen and S Treumer (eds), New EU Public Procurement Directives (DJØF, 2005) 97 
and ff; and C Barnard, ‘Using Procurement Law to Enforce Labour Standards’, in G Davidov and B Langille (eds), 
The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 256-272. For recent discussion, see C Barnard, ‘To Boldly 
Go: Social Clauses in Public Procurement’ (2017) Industrial Law Journal (forthc.) available at 
https://doi.org/10.1093/indlaw/dww036; and K Jaehrling, ‘The state as a “socially responsible customer”? Public 
procurement between market-making and market-embedding’ (2015) 21(2) European Journal of Industrial 
Relations 149-164. 
4 This is not unique or peculiar to the EU. For a critical assessment of equivalent regulatory practices in Australia, 
see S Holley, G Maconachie and M Goodwin, ‘Government procurement contracts and minimum labour 
standards enforcement: Rhetoric, duplication and distraction?’ (2015) 26(1) Economic and Labour Relations 
Review 43-59. 
5 See European Commission, Buying Social – A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public 
Procurement (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=978 (but 
note that this guidance was issued under the previous generation of EU public procurement rules).For a recent 
overview of the implementation of such policy, although on the basis of a questionable empirical methodology, 
see the Study on “Strategic use of public procurement in promoting green, social and innovation policies” (2015), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/17261.  
6 Communication from the Commission COM(2010) 2020 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52010DC2020. For a critical assessment, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Truly 
competitive public procurement as a Europe 2020 lever: what role for the principle of competition in moderating 
horizontal policies?’ (2016) 22(2) European Public Law 377-394. 
7 For discussion, see D Schiek et al, EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law, Study for the 
European Parliament (2015), IP/A/EMPL/ST/2014-02, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/563457/IPOL_STU%282015%29563457_EN.pdf.  
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adopt harmonising substantive labour standards, as well as the limitations of a system based on rules 
that only regulate the fringe aspects of cross-border labour mobility.8 More generally, the logic of 
prevention of social dumping implicit in the use of procurement to uphold labour standards clashes 
with that of market integration,9 particularly for the provision of services.10 This evidences a regulatory 
difficulty that is rather unique to the EU context—where economic law suffers important tensions and 
limitations due to its market-integrative approach and the competence split between the Union and 
its Member States—which can have detrimental implications for the internal consistency and the 
functionality of the regulatory system, not least due to the potential spillovers in terms of reverse 
discrimination that the unstable balance between these competing logics tends to create.11 
On the back of recent developments in the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
regarding cross-border situations of procurement-based enforcement of labour standards—notably 
in the re-examination of Rüffert12 in Bundesdruckerei13 and RegioPost14 cases—in the remainder of 
this paper, I reflect on this phenomenon from the perspective of regulatory substitution. In setting out 
a basic framework to assess regulatory substitution, I hypothesise that most of the difficulties 
evidenced by the ECJ case law in this area stem from the transfer of labour regulation goals to the 
public procurement sphere.15 I then aim to test this hypothesis by means of an analysis of labour 
                                                          
8 For background discussion, see H Verschueren, ‘The European Internal Market and the Competition between 
Workers’ (2015) 6(2) European Labour Law Journal 128-151; S Garben, ‘The Constitutional (Im)balance between 
‘the Market’ and ‘the Social’ in the European Union’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 23-61. 
9 M De Vos, ‘Internal market and euro crisis: labour law under the gun of the European Union?’ (2013) 14(3) ERA 
Forum 335-361. 
10 See European Commission, Supporting social responsibility in the economy through public procurement, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8667. For 
discussion of the competing rationales for EU intervention in domestic labour law and, indirectly, for the 
justification of restrictions in the creation of a single EU labour market, see P Syrpis, EU Intervention in Domestic 
Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 10-75. 
11 The same problem arises in connection with other public procurement rules, such as exclusion requirements; 
see A Sanchez-Graells, L Butler and P Telles, ‘Exclusion and Qualitative Selection of Economic Operators under 
Public Procurement Procedures. A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions’, in M Burgi, M Trybus and S 
Treumer (eds), Qualification, Exclusion and Selection in EU Procurements, vol. 7 European Procurement Law 
Series (DJØF, 2016) 245-274. For background discussion, see A Tryfonidou, ‘Reverse Discrimination in Purely 
Internal Situations: An Incongruity in a Citizens’ Europe’ (2008) 35(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 43-67. 
See also D Hanf, ‘Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: Constitutional Aberration, Constitutional Necessity, or 
Judicial Choice’ (2011) 18(1) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 29-61; and P Van Elsuwege, 
‘The Phenomenon of Reverse Discrimination: An Anomaly in the European Constitutional Order?’, in L S Rossi & 
F Casolari, The EU after Lisbon. Amending or Coping with the Existing Treaties? (Springer, 2014) 161-176. 
12 Judgment of 3 April 2008 in Rüffert, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189. 
13 Judgment of 18 September 2014 in Bundesdruckerei, C-549/13, EU:C:2014:2235. See A Brown, ‘The lawfulness 
of a national rule requiring a subcontractor of a bidder for a public contract to pay its workers a minimum wage, 
even where the services will be carried out exclusively in a lower-cost third country: case C-549/13 
Bundesdruckerei GmbH v Stadt Dortmund’ (2015) Public Procurement Law Review NA17-NA21. 
14 Judgment of 17 November 2015 in RegioPost, C-115/14, EU:C:2015:760. See F Costamagna, ‘Minimum Wage 
between Public Procurement and Posted Workers: Anything New after the RegioPost Case?’ (2017) 42(1) 
European Law Review 101-111; A Brown, ‘The lawfulness of a regional law requiring tenderers for a public 
contract to undertake to pay workers performing that contract the minimum wage laid down in that law: Case 
C-115/14 RegioPost’, (2016) Public Procurement Law Review NA49-NA55; and C Kaupa, ‘Public Procurement, 
Social Policy and Minimum Wage Regulation for Posted Workers: Towards a More Balanced Socio-Economic 
Integration Process?’ (2016) 1(1) European Papers 127-138. 
15 Note that this is not unique to labour policy, and that there are other aspects of regulatory substitution taking 
place at the same time, such as in relation with the enforcement of environmental or competition law. For a 
broader discussion, on the similar basis of what they term ‘external regulatory compliance’, see G S Ølykke and 
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policy-oriented mechanisms included in the 2014 revision of the EU public procurement rules.16 I then 
go on to critically assess the fitness for purpose of the procurement mechanisms from the perspective 
of contributing to the enforcement of labour standards. I ultimately conclude that, even though the 
2014 Public Procurement Package has galvanised the trend of regulatory substitution whereby 
employment and social goals have now become part and parcel of public procurement strategy in the 
EU, a close examination of the legal mechanisms created by Directive 2014/24/EU shows that this 
regulatory substitution is both limited and highly dependent on the implementation (and investment 
of significant administrative resources) at Member State level. 
 
A basic framework of regulatory substitution, or public procurement  
as a regulatory garbage can 
The regulation of the EU’s internal market is clearly affected by different underlying political agendas 
and normative models, or different conceptions of the EU’s economic constitution (or its absence). It 
also seems clear that the choice of regulatory instruments is not simply a matter of institutional choice 
or dynamics, but also a function of the range of legal opportunities available to decision-makers.17 
Therefore, the extent to which a set of rules and regulations is used in the pursuit of one or other set 
of goals is the result of the complex interaction of both substantive, procedural and rather chanceful 
factors. These issues can be assessed both from a holistic perspective, or in terms of the overarching 
model of European (economic) integration, or in relation with discrete sets of policies and their impact 
on their twin area of EU economic law. The former is a very general topic that exceeds the possibilities 
of this paper, so the bulk of this discussion will concentrate on the later perspective in the areas of 
public procurement and labour law. The analysis will be carried out from the perspective of public 
procurement as the ‘landing area’ of regulatory goals traditionally assigned to labour law. 
The reasons why this regulatory transfer is taking place, or the ways in which these goals could 
be better achieved through labour and employment policy and regulation will not be explicitly 
considered. Suffice it to point out here that there is a strong link between regulatory substitution (in 
terms of transfer of normative requirements) and the development of suitable administrative 
processes and systems. The discussion in this paper will show how, beyond issues of regulatory 
reform, the effectiveness of the intended regulatory transfer is highly dependent on the level of 
resources invested in the enforcement of labour standards in the procurement context.18 From that 
perspective, given that Member States have not succeeded in agreeing on labour standards at EU level 
in general, and that some of them operate under rather constrained self-standing mechanisms for the 
enforcement of labour standards in their jurisdiction in particular,19 it is questionable whether they 
                                                          
P Telles, ‘A Compliance Perspective on EU Public Procurement’, forthcoming in the European Procurement & 
Public Private Partnership Law Review. 
16 Generally, on this process of review of the applicable EU rules, see G S Ølykke and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), 
Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar, 2016). 
17 B G Peters, Advanced Introduction to Public Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 111. 
18 For general discussion in a related area of EU policy, see S Schucht, ‘What can we learn from economics and 
political science analysis on the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation?’, in M Glachant (ed), 
Implementing European Environmental Policy: The Impacts of Directives in the Member States (Edward Elgar, 
2001) 30-58. 
19 Eg, in relation with occupational safety and health (OSH) legislation, see Committee of Senior Labour 
Inspectors, Challenges faced by Labour Inspectorates relating to enforcement - Contribution to the ex-post 
evaluation of the OSH legislation carried out by the European Commission (2015), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=14311&langId=en.  
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would really be committed to develop the required suitable domestic administrative structures and 
get through the back door what they did not accept through the front door. The analysis in this paper 
could also prompt a discussion of transparency in labour policy-making, as well as issues around 
accountability in public expenditure. All of these perspectives are potentially fruitful for an analysis 
beyond that of regulatory substitution between labour and procurement law, but they also exceed 
the possibilities of this paper. 
Here, I hypothesise that there has been progressive regulatory substitution (or at least 
pressure for it to take place) in recent years, whereby labour regulatory goals have been pushed 
towards the core of public procurement regulation. Further, I also submit that this is rather accidental 
and a reflection of the structural position of public procurement as a regulatory garbage can,20 which 
makes it difficult to keep regulatory priorities focused on the main goals of this instrument for the 
functioning of the public sector. This creates difficulties for the development of case law in this area, 
as well as for the implementation of policies that may be structurally-flawed in their misalignment 
with the constraints derived from general aspects of EU internal market regulation. In that regard, I 
think that some of the difficulties derived from the line of case law concerning the use of public 
procurement for the enforcement of minimum wage requirements discussed below reflects this 
position of public procurement as a regulatory garbage can. This is because, after a first attempt to 
implement wage policies through procurement in the early 2000s and the ECJ’s significant constraint 
of that possibility in Rüffert, it could have been possible to discard that policy as contrary to internal 
market regulation and rather concentrate regulatory efforts on the development of EU labour and 
employment law. However, due to the difficulties in advancing in that area, the regulatory pressure 
came back to the procurement arena in the form of different instruments for the implementation of 
social and employment policy through public contracts.  
This has now led to a second wave of ECJ case law in Bundesdruckerei and RegioPost, which 
demonstrate both the persistence and strength of the internal market logic underpinning 
procurement regulation in the EU (Bundesdruckerei) and the limitations derived from the peculiar 
distribution of regulatory competence between the European Union and its Member States 
(RegioPost)—which comes to replicate in the procurement arena some of the difficulties for the 
development of EU-wide labour and employment rules. This is problematic because it both creates a 
confusing regulatory situation in the area of public procurement depending on extraneous regulatory 
instruments (such as the Posted Workers Directive, see below), and because of the multiplicity of 
regulatory areas that potentially impact on public procurement as a transversal regulatory tool (ie 
similar dynamics can be observed, to a different extent, concerning green and innovation 
procurement). Ultimately, the position of public procurement as a regulatory garbage can is nothing 
new but, in my opinion, this does not mean that a case should not be made against such trends of 
regulatory substitution or instrumentalisation of public procurement, which could reduce the 
difficulties around the design of effective policy instruments and a (more) coherent case law around 
its own set of first principles and goals.21 
Indeed, even if not always made explicit, several goals of public procurement rules have 
largely conditioned their development and determined the functions that they have been called upon 
to serve. At least nine primary goals of different procurement systems have been identified: 
competition, integrity, transparency, efficiency of the procurement system, customer satisfaction, 
                                                          
20 For the seminal construction of the model, see M D Cohen, J G March and J P Olsen, ‘A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice’ (1972) 17(1) Administrative Science Quarterly 1-25. 
21 Along the same lines, see Ølykke and Telles (n 15). 
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best value for money, wealth distribution, risk avoidance, and uniformity of rules.22 Some of them are 
closely related, some are instrumental to one another, while others are in open conflict;23 and not all 
of them are equally desirable. Most noteworthy, economic objectives will have a particularly 
remarkable role in shaping public procurement regimes.24 Moreover, no system can achieve all of 
those goals simultaneously, so their pursuance will require certain trade-offs.25 Competition, integrity 
and transparency can be considered the overarching and most desirable goals of public procurement 
regulation,26 and a proper balance with the efficiency of the procurement systems needs to be 
reached.27  
However, over time and across different systems, public procurement has been 
instrumentalised to achieve socio-political aims that differ from and often contradict its basic goals 
(competition, integrity and transparency) and function—ie, providing the public buyer with those 
goods and services required for his proper functioning, in the best possible conditions as to price, 
quality, timely delivery, etc. Goals such as market integration objectives, industrial policy and 
innovation policy, promotion of small businesses, social28or labour-related policies29 (such as the 
promotion of minimum wages in procurement discussed in detail in this paper), environmental and 
                                                          
22 SL Schooner, ‘Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Business-like Government’ (2001) 50 American 
University Law Review 627, 709-710, and ibid, ‘Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law’ 
(2002) 11 Public Procurement Law Review 103, 104-109; and SL Schooner et al, Public Procurement Systems: 
Unpacking Stakeholder Aspirations and Expectations (George Washington University Law School, Public Law and 
Legal Theory Working Paper, Legal Studies Research Paper, 2008), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133234. 
23 JN Dertouzos, ‘Introduction’ in AG Bower and JN Dertouzos (eds), Essays in the Economics of Procurement 
(RAND—National Defense Research Institute, 1994) 1, 4. 
24 PA Trepte, Regulating Procurement. Understanding the Ends and Means of Public Procurement Regulation 
(Oxford University Press, 2004) 63. That is particularly true, at least in the EU; see C Bovis, Public Procurement 
in the European Union (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005) 25. 
25 Schooner et al (n 22) 4; and PA Trepte, ‘Transparency Requirements’ in R Nielsen and S Treumer (eds), New 
EU Public Procurement Directives (DJØF, 2005) 49, 52. 
26 Schooner, Desiderata (n 22) 104-106 and 110. Similarly, although with some terminological differences, see 
Trepte (n 24) 3. See also S Arrowsmith ‘The Past and Future Evolution of EC Public Procurement Law: From 
Framework to Common Code?’ (2005-2006) 35 Public Contract Law Journal 337, 351-352; and S Kelman, 
Procurement and Public Management. The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance (AEI 
Press, 1990) 11. 
27 The position that the efficiency of the system and the focus on competition as a means to achieve value for 
money are preferred has been strongly criticised by S Arrowsmith, ‘The Purpose of the EU Procurement 
Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for National Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizontal 
Procurement Policies’ (2011-2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 1; and P Kunzlik, 
‘Neoliberalism and the European Public Procurement Regime’ (2012-2013) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 283. On the contrary, it has been praised by CR Yukins and J Cora, ‘Feature Comment: Considering 
the Effects of Public Procurement Regulations on Competitive Markets’ (2013) 55(9) Government Contractor 64. 
28 See eg G Quinot, ‘Promotion of social policy through public procurement in Africa’, in S Arrowsmith and G 
Quinot (eds), Public Procurement Regulation in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 370. 
29 C McCrudden, ‘Social Policy Issues in Public Procurement: A Legal Overview’ in S Arrowsmith and A Davies 
(eds), Public Procurement: Global Revolution (London, Kluwer Law International, 1998) 219; ibid, ‘International 
Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion on the Legality of ‘Selective 
Purchasing’ Laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement’ (1999) 2 Journal of International 
Economic Law 3; ibid, ‘Buying Social Justice: Equality and Public Procurement’ (2007) 60 Current Legal Problems 
121. See also references above (n 3). 
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other considerations,30 have been the object of so-called ‘secondary’31 or ‘horizontal policies’.32 Some 
of these secondary policies are largely consistent with the main goals of public procurement—such as 
market integration objectives, which can contribute to the increase of competition in certain sectors 
of economic activity—but others are completely unrelated to the core function and objectives of the 
public procurement system,33 and could significantly jeopardise its proper implementation, not to 
mention the issue of their limited effectiveness. To that extent, from a normative standpoint, I 
consider that some secondary policies should be abandoned or, at least, re-adjusted to become more 
competition-oriented.34 The use of public procurement as an instrument of (macroeconomic) policy 
should be separated from its function as a working tool of the government and, in this dimension, it 
should be set free from such secondary policies—precisely in order to increase the efficiency of the 
primary policy objectives that are to be implemented through procurement activities. Doing otherwise 
can be a source of market distortions that will rarely contribute to increasing social welfare.35 
In the context of the EU’s internal market, the regulation of public procurement has also been 
strongly oriented towards a market integration goal.36 In their effort to reach an internal market, EU 
institutions placed market integration as the paramount goal of public procurement regulations and 
made it a key element in the 1992 strategy for the completion of the single market.37 Discrimination 
and protectionism in public procurement was considered a non-tariff barrier to intra-EU trade,38 and 
significant efforts were put into getting the Member States to abandon those policies. Important 
progress has been made in the last 25 years and the gradual liberalisation of public procurement 
markets in the EU has taken place. Despite the recent use of public procurement as a lever for the 
further development of the internal market within the context of the Europe 2020 strategy,39 this has 
                                                          
30 Other policies have included, eg, the ban on certain ideologies and/or organisations on the basis of the 
protection of constitutional values; see H-J Prieβ and C Pitschas, ‘Secondary Policy Criteria and Their 
Compatibility with EC and WTO Procurement Law. The Case for the German Scientology Declaration’ (2000) 9 
Public Procurement Law Review 171, 172-186. 
31 On these issues, see S Arrowsmith, ‘Public Procurement as an Instrument of Policy and the Impact of Market 
Liberalisation’ (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 235; PA Trepte, Public Procurement in the EU: A Practitioner’s 
Guide, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2007) 63-87. For a review of these policies in EU legislation and case 
law, see the various contributions to S Arrowsmith and P Kunzlik (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law. New Directives and New Directions (Cambridge University Press, 2009). See also E Reid, 
‘Protecting Non-Economic Interests in the European Community Legal Order: A Sustainable Development?’ 
(2005) 24 Yearbook of European Law 385. 
32 S Arrowsmith, ‘Horizontal Policies in Public Procurement: A Taxonomy,’ (2010) 10(2) Journal of Public 
Procurement 149. 
33 Indeed, they have been considered extraneous goals of public procurement; see SL Schooner, ‘Commercial 
Purchasing: The Chasm between the United States Government’s Evolving Policy and Practice’, in S Arrowsmith 
and M Trybus (eds), Public Procurement: The Continuing Revolution (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003) 
137, 159 fn 105; and Schooner et al (n 22) 14. 
34 For extended discussion and further references, see A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU 
Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Hart, 2015) 101-114. 
35 For general discussion on the conflicts between such secondary policies and the main economic goals of public 
procurement regulations, Trepte (n 24) 133-207. 
36 For scholars such as Arrowsmith (n 27), this remains the sole and limited goal of EU public procurement. 
37 See JA Sohrab, ‘The Single European Market and Public Procurement’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
522, 524. 
38 P A Geroski, ‘European Industrial Policy and Industrial Policy in Europe’ (1989) 5 Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 20, 29-30. 
39 Indeed, it has been stressed that in order to contribute to the objectives of the Europe2020 strategy, ‘public 
procurement policy must ensure the most efficient use of public funds and procurement markets must be kept 
open EU-wide’; European Commission, Europe2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
(COM/2010/2020 final). See also European Commission, EU public procurement legislation: delivering results. 
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not been based on integration for its own sake, but on the strategic use of public procurement 
optimisation as a tool to foster economic growth and economic efficiency in competitiveness.40 
Consequently, the market integration objective is being phased out or, at least, re-oriented towards 
substantive economic goals. 
Following that regulatory trend and going back to the issue of the instrumental use of 
procurement, once the internal market has reached maturity, the transitory goal of market integration 
is being progressively substituted by other secondary policies (notably, social and environmental 
policies). EU public procurement policy seems to be on a path that might significantly diverge from its 
basic and fundamental goal of promoting competition by ‘reintroducing’ secondary policies.41 This was 
clear in the process of revision of the 2004 generation of EU public procurement directives that the 
European Commission started in 2011. In its Green Paper on the modernisation of public procurement 
policy,42 the Commission made it clear that a fundamental objective of the reform was to support 
emerging trends on the strategic use of public procurement in response to new challenges and, in 
particular, it indicated that procuring entities “can make an important contribution to the achievement 
of the Europe 2020 strategic goals, by using their purchasing power to procure goods and services with 
higher "societal" value in terms of … improving employment … and social conditions, and promoting 
equality while improving inclusion of disadvantaged groups”.43 This approach then informed the 
proposal for a new directive also published in 2011, where the Commission reiterated this goal of the 
regulatory reform process to adopt an “enabling approach providing contracting authorities with the 
instruments needed to contribute to the achievement of the Europe 2020 strategic goals by using their 
purchasing power to procure goods and services that foster innovation, respect the environment and 
combat climate change while improving employment, public health and social conditions”.44 This 
orientation towards employment and social goals then permeated the legislative debates and ended 
up forming an important part of the final text of Directive 2014/24/EU,45 which is the cornerstone of 
the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package. 
In terms of current policy, the European Commission has stressed how Directive 2014/24/EU 
is strategically oriented towards socially responsible public procurement46 and, more specifically, how 
it aims at ending social dumping by respecting social and labour laws: 
Under a new ‘social clause’, public authorities will need to ensure the respect of obligations in all public 
procurement procedures. These include national or EU social and labour rules, applicable collective 
agreements and/or international law. Tenders may be excluded if they do not comply with social or 
                                                          
Summary of evaluation report (2012) and, in more detail, Commission Staff Working Paper, Evaluation Report. 
Impact and Effectiveness of EU Public Procurement Legislation (2011), available at 
http://www.eipa.eu/files/topics/public_procurement/executive_summary_en.pdf. 
40 See the Single Market Act, ‘this simplification must be carried out in a way that does not close procurement to 
cross-border competition’; Communication from the Commission, Single Market Act: Twelve levers to boost 
growth and strengthen confidence "Working together to create new growth" (COM/2011/0206 final). 
41 AI Matei and L Matei, ‘Modernisation of the Public Procurement Market. Towards a Strategy of Public 
Marketing specific on the Single Market’ (2012) 1(1) Societal Innovations for Global Growth 497-511. 
42 European Commission, Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy. Towards a more 
efficient European Procurement Market, COM(2011) 15 final. 
43 Green paper, 33-34. 
44 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public 
procurement, COM(2011) 896 final, 9. 
45 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public 
procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L94/65. 
46 European Commission, Public procurement strategy, available at https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-
market/public-procurement/strategy_en.  
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labour law obligations. When the tender value is abnormally low because the offer does not comply 
with such obligations, then the tender must be rejected. Furthermore, any company failing to comply 
with their obligations will be excluded from public procurement procedures if: 
• It has been convicted of failure to pay taxes or social security contributions 
• no judgment has been passed but it can be proved that the company has failed to pay taxes 
or social contributions, or has failed to comply with the 'social clause'.47 
Directive 2014/24/EU also includes mechanisms whereby contracting authorities can specify 
employment-related and social requirements as part of contract compliance clauses (Art 70). This is 
seen as another major contribution to socially responsible public procurement, inasmuch as the 
awarding of a contract will no longer be dependent on price alone if a company commits to achieve 
social or employment-related goals. In the view of the Commission: 
Contracting authorities can better take social aspects into account when awarding procurement 
contracts on the basis of the 'best price-quality ratio (BPQR)', i.e. they can choose the tenders that 
provide more social advantages. This could be, for example, a company employing the greatest number 
of long-term unemployed or disadvantaged persons to perform the contract or increase participation 
of women in the labour market.48 
Therefore, under the 2014 EU Public Procurement Package, labour and social goals have 
become prominent elements of the strategy to instrumentalise procurement under the so called 
smart procurement approach. In this area of interaction of labour law and public procurement law, I 
submit that there has been a (push for a) double regulatory substitution relationship. At a higher level 
of generality, there is a transfer of policy and regulatory goals from labour to public procurement law, 
in particular in terms of monitoring and enforcement of labour and social law. At a second level, within 
specific public procurement processes, there is a transfer between regulatory tools and contractual 
tools, and a tendency to (aim to) contractualise employment and social obligations that do not derive 
from existing employment and social legislation.49 This double dynamic removes the regulation of 
labour standards from its ‘natural’ field—that of labour and employment policy—and transplants it 
into the very different setting of the award of public contracts in the context of procurement 
procedures. This is bound to create significant distortions and increased costs in the running of 
procurement processes. Moreover, the extent to which such regulatory substitution is possible 
depends on the adaptability of the internal market logic (and goal) that underpin EU public 
procurement law. This is particularly challenging because, differently from the pursuit of other 
strategic goals (such as green or innovative procurement), the inclusion of employment and social 
considerations has a strong geographical dimension that makes it harder to reconceptualise with the 
internal market logic. 
The remainder of the paper offers a critical assessment of the main mechanisms introduced 
in Directive 2014/24/EU in support of socially responsible public procurement, with a particular focus 
on the enforcement of labour standards (and, in particular, pay or wage requirements). It also 
                                                          
47 European Commission, Supporting social responsibility in the economy through public procurement, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-
databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=8667&lang=en&title=Supporting-social-responsibility-in-the-
economy-through-public-procurement.  
48 European Commission, EU Public Procurement reform: Less bureaucracy, higher efficiency, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/16349/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native.  
49 This is certainly not a new phenomenon in the area of public procurement. See C Turpin, Government 
Procurement and Contracts (Longman, 1989) 67. 
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considers the extent to which the internal market logic (and goal) that underpin EU public 
procurement law are actually likely to adapt to this strategic goal, or allow for its effective delivery. 
 
Critical assessment of the of pro-labour standards mechanisms  
of the 2014 EU public procurement rules 
The regulatory trend of inclusion of pro-labour standard mechanisms into EU public procurement rules 
has taken place at different levels and in relation to different stages of the procurement process. For 
the purposes of their detailed assessment, it will be useful to distinguish between negative 
mechanisms aimed at leveraging compliance with existing mandatory rules, and positive mechanisms 
aimed at imposing labour standards beyond those mandated by applicable rules. The specific issue of 
the enforcement of pay-related labour standards, as discussed in the ECJ case law in Bundesdruckerei 
and RegioPost, falls somewhat between both categories because one of the legal issues in these cases 
concerned the extent to which pay-related labour standards were or not applicable to some (cross-
border) tenderers. However, at least conceptually, it seems appropriate to discuss this as part of the 
positive mechanisms aimed at imposing specific labour standards for the execution of the contract.50 
 
Negative pro-labour standards mechanisms: using procurement to enforce existing rules 
Public procurement, as a significant and rather visible part of the activity of the public sector, can serve 
to support legal compliance.51 In that regard, it is common for public procurement systems to foresee 
the exclusion of undertakings that breach tax, social security or other laws with a close link to the 
financial interests of the State. Recently, and as part of the broader regulatory trend discussed in this 
paper, EU procurement law has been reformed to facilitate its use as a mechanism to leverage 
compliance with other regulatory requirements. Importantly, a general duty for the EU’s Member 
States to ensure compliance with relevant labour standards has been enacted in Article 18(2) of 
Directive 2014/24/EU, according to which ‘Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure 
that in the performance of public contracts economic operators comply with applicable obligations in 
the fields of … social and labour law established by Union law, national law, collective agreements or 
                                                          
50 This is clearly the case in Bundesdruckerei, as the relevant regional legislation was not directly applicable to a 
cross-border tenderer. In the case of RegioPost, this approach is more debatable, given that the relevant regional 
law did apply to the challenging tenderer. However, given that the regional law (and the contract compliance 
clause to which it could implicitly give rise) aimed to go beyond what would otherwise result from generally 
applicable legislation, I submit that this analytical approach is useful. 
51 More generally, in jurisdictions with a develop set of public law constraints on procuring entities, it is common 
to require them to act in compliance with the law, or to act legally, and not to support or facilitate any type of 
legal infringements. For discussion, see P Craig, ‘Article 41 – Right to Good Administration’, in S Peers, T Hervey, 
J Kenner and A Ward (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart, 2014) 1069-1098; and 
A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Assessing the Public Administration’s Intention in EU Economic Law: Chasing Ghosts or 
Dressing Windows?’, in KA Armstrong (ed), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2016, vol 18 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016) 93-121. 
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by the international … social and labour law provisions listed in Annex X’—which, in relation to 
employment and labour law, lists ILO Conventions 29,52 87,53 98,54 100,55 105,56 111,57 13858 and 182.59  
This general principle can hardly be seen as creating any obligation of its own.60 However, it is 
coupled with more specific rules concerning (1) a duty to engage in an in-depth analysis of tenders 
that seem abnormally low due to the reduced costs derived from non-compliance with applicable 
social and labour obligations, with a view to their mandatory rejection if non-compliance is 
ascertained (Art 69(3) in fine),61 as well as (2) the creation of discretion for contracting authorities to 
(i) exclude tenderers that are shown to be in violation of Art 18(2) obligations (Art 57(4)(a)),62 including 
their subcontractors (Art 71),63 or (ii) decide not to award a contract to the tenderer submitting the 
most economically advantageous tender where it does not comply with applicable Art 18(2) 
obligations (Art 56(1) in fine).64 Therefore, from a negative perspective, Directive 2014/24/EU includes 
mechanisms for contracting authorities not to support infringements of Art 18(2) obligations by 
withholding the award of contracts which execution would entail an infringement of those obligations, 
as well as by excluding tenderers that have infringed those obligations even outside of the scope of 
the tendered contract. 
These new grounds for exclusion of tenderers and/or rejection of their tenders raise 
difficulties around the need to establish the standard of diligence that the contracting authority must 
discharge in order not to be negligently unaware of the existence of such violations—particularly 
where it is under a duty to investigate and exclude (ie in the case of abnormally low tenders). Given 
that there are different standards for different exclusion grounds (some of them being mandatory, 
such as in relation with abnormally low tenders, while the rest remain discretionary), these are issues 
that are prone to litigation and that will likely require interpretation by the ECJ. In that regard, it is 
submitted that any means of proof should suffice to proceed to such exclusion,65 but the violation 
should be of a sufficient intensity as to justify the exclusion under a proportionality test (similarly to 
                                                          
52 ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour. 
53 ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise. 
54 ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining. 
55 ILO Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration. 
56 ILO Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour. 
57 ILO Convention 111 on Discrimination (Employment and Occupation). 
58 ILO Convention 138 on Minimum Age. 
59 ILO Convention 182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour. 
60 In fact, some Member States (such as the UK) have decided not to transpose it into their domestic laws. See 
A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The Implementation of Directive 2014/24/EU in the UK’, in S Treumer & M Comba (eds), 
Implementation of Directive 2014/24 (Edward Elgar, forthc.), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947939. 
61 For in-depth analysis, see G S Ølykke, ‘The Provision on Abnormally Low Tenders: A Safeguard for Fair 
Competition’, in G S Ølykke and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public 
Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar, 2016) 146-169. 
62 S de Mars, ‘Exclusion and Self-Cleaning in Article 57: Discretion at the Expense of Clarity and Trade?’, in G S 
Ølykke and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward 
Elgar, 2016) 253-273. 
63 R Craven, ‘Subcontracting Matters: Articles 43 and 71 of the 2014 Directive, in G S Ølykke and A Sanchez-
Graells (eds), Reformation or Deformation of the EU Public Procurement Rules (Edward Elgar, 2016) 295-317. 
64 Sanchez-Graells (n 34) 288. 
65 Provided other procedural guarantees are upheld. For discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, “‘If it Ain't Broke, 
Don't Fix It’? EU Requirements of Administrative Oversight and Judicial Protection for Public Contracts”, in S 
Torricelli & F Folliot Lalliot (eds), Administrative Oversight and Judicial Protection for Public Contracts (Larcier, 
forthc.), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2821828. 
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what the new Directive proposes in terms of lack of payment of taxes or social security contributions,66 
or ‘grave’ professional misconduct), since exclusion for any minor infringement of social, labour or 
environmental requirements may be disproportionate and, ultimately, not in the public interest if it 
affects the level and intensity of competition for the contracts. 
On a more technical note, it is also worth emphasising that both Art 56(1) in fine and 57(4)(a) 
of Directive 2014/24/EU serve exactly the same function—ie the strengthening of the social, labour 
and environmental aspects of the public procurement function, although in a manner that can 
seriously diminish its economic effectiveness and that can impose a burden difficult to discharge on 
contracting authorities (which could now be in a difficult position where they will need to assess 
tenderers’ and tenders’ compliance with an increased set of diverse rules of a social, labour and 
environmental nature). Indeed, both provisions aim at the same outcome, with the only apparent 
difference that Art 56(1) in fine is concerned with the tender specifically, whereas Art 57(4)(a) is 
concerned with the tenderer more generally. Consequently, Art 57(4)(a) may be seen as a rule that 
looks at the past and present (general) compliance of the economic operator with social, labour and 
environmental law, whereas Art 56(1) in fine allows the contracting authority to make a prognosis of 
compliance and reject a tender if its (future) implementation would imply non-compliance with social, 
labour and environmental law requirements—which is, in any case, mandatory under Art 69(3) if there 
has been an investigation on the tenders’ apparent abnormality. The effectiveness of these provisions 
will largely depend on the transposition decisions of the Member States and, ultimately, on the actual 
capacity of contracting authorities to engage in such (possibly complex) assessments of compliance 
with EU, domestic and international social, labour and environmental rules (as discussed below). 
 
Positive pro-labour standards mechanisms: using procurement to go beyond existing rules? 
Beyond those negative measures, Directive 2014/24/EU also includes positive mechanisms that can 
be seen to facilitate the use of procurement requirements to go beyond existing labour rules and to 
mandate compliance with higher standards. In particular, Art 70 foresees that contracting authorities 
may lay down special conditions relating to the performance of a contract, provided that they are 
linked to the subject-matter of the contract67 and indicated in the call for competition or in the 
procurement documents, and that those conditions may include social or employment-related 
considerations. This provision has introduced some drafting modifications to its predecessor in Art 26 
of Directive 2004/18/EC,68 in particular to stress that the conditions for the performance of the contact 
can include ‘employment-related considerations’, which has been seen as an indication that the 2014 
rules are more open to their use for the enforcement of labour and employment-related standards 
than the previous generation of 2004 directives.69 However, in my view, the substantive content of 
the provision remains unchanged.  
                                                          
66 Art 57(3) in fine. For discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Exclusion, Qualitative Selection and Short-listing’, in F 
Lichère, R Caranta and S Treumer (eds), Modernising Public Procurement. The New Directive (DJØF, 2014) 97-
129. 
67 See A Semple, ‘The Link to the Subject Matter: A Glass Ceiling for Sustainable Public Contracts?’, in B Sjåfjell 
and A Wiesbrock (eds), Sustainable Public Procurement under EU Law. New Perspectives on the State as 
Stakeholder (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 50-74. 
68 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of 
procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] 
OJ L134/114. 
69 Along those lines, S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and UK, 3rd 
edn, vol. 1 (Sweet & Mawell, 2014) 746-747; see also OECD-SIGMA, Incorporating Social Considerations into 
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In general terms, and at first reading, Art 70 of Directive 2014/24/EU could be seen as a rather 
flexible framework for contracting authorities to build any specific labour or employment standards 
they desired into their public contracts—for instance, establishing their own tailor-made health and 
safety requirements, imposing higher pay standards than would otherwise be applicable (such as 
public sector minimum wages, living wages, or similar, as discussed below), or demanding any other 
measures to be implemented by their suppliers and service providers. Nonetheless, this interpretation 
is open to challenge on the basis of the requirement for contract compliance clauses to be linked to 
the subject matter of the contract, and for them to comply with the requirements of EU law more 
generally. 
At the outset, it is important to stress that, where contracting authorities decided to make 
extensive use of contract compliance clauses, competition for the public contract could be rather 
easily distorted by strategic tenderers offering to comply with those additional requirements ex ante—
thereby formally complying with the award criterion—and breaching the contractual covenant ex 
post—being then subject to penalties or other contractual remedies, which are largely irrelevant for 
analytical purposes.70 Ensuring that the award of contracts according to this type of award criteria—
particularly if they are given significant weight by the contracting authority—does not result in 
discrimination or a distortion of competition through the strategic behaviour of tenderers (and, 
eventually, of contracting authorities themselves) would require a significant amount of monitoring 
and surveillance after the award of the contract—which is costly and difficult to conduct by any agent 
other than the parties to the contract. In such circumstances, the room for discrimination and 
distortions of competition is widened and, consequently, the possibilities for the exercise of unlimited 
discretion and for the generation of discriminatory and anti-competitive outcomes might be unduly 
increased. In this regard, I consider that, unless very relevant (exceptional) circumstances make the 
adoption or weighting of such criteria essential or difficult to avoid in relation to the specific subject-
matter of a given contract, contracting authorities are bound not to adopt, or to give marginal weight 
to, award criteria of a forward-looking nature that are not possible to verify or validate at tender 
evaluation stage (or, more generally, before contract implementation).71 
More specifically, one issue that has triggered litigation in recent times concerns the possibility 
of mandating compliance with minimum rates of pay to favour the employees of the undertakings 
involved in the execution of public contracts. Such use of public procurement for the enforcement of 
social policies and, in particular, for the imposition of labour standards and minimum wage 
requirements has been both widespread and controversial in the EU.72 The case law of the ECJ has 
been considered restrictive of the possibilities of using public procurement to enforce minimum wage 
standards in a flexible way. This rigidity has been particularly linked to the Rüffert case,73 and the way 
in which the ECJ linked the possibility of using procurement to enforce labour standards to 
                                                          
Public Procurement, Public Procurement Brief 14 (2016), available at http://sigmaweb.org/publications/Public-
Procurement-Policy-Brief-14-200117.pdf. 
70 See also G Racca, R Cavallo Perin and GL Albano, ‘Competition in the Execution Phase of Public Procurement’ 
(2011) 41(1) Public Contract Law Journal 89. 
71 On the ban against using award criteria that are not possible to verify, see Judgment of 4 December 2003 in 
EVN and Wienstrom, C-448/01, EU:C:2003:651, para [52]. 
72 For an interesting discussion, see A Wiesbrock, ‘Socially Responsible Public Procurement. European Value or 
National Choice?’ in B Sjåfjell and A Wiesbrock (eds), Sustainable Public Procurement Under EU Law: New 
Perspectives on the State as Stakeholder (Cambridge University Press, 2016) 75-98. 
73 Rüffert, C-346/06, EU:C:2008:189. For discussion, see R Caranta, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement in the EU’, 
in R Caranta and M Trybus (eds), The Law of Green and Social Procurement in Europe (DJØF, 2010) 15, 35-38. 
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compatibility with EU law and, in particular, with the Posted Workers Directive (PWD).74 In that regard, 
it is worth stressing that the PWD allows Member States to impose compliance with terms and 
conditions on minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates, in relation to workers posted to their 
territory and whatever the law applicable to the employment relationship, where those are laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative provision, and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards 
which have been declared universally applicable.75 
In Rüffert, the contracting authority had required tenderers to pay employees employed on 
the building site at least the minimum wage in force at the place where those services were 
performed, which was determined by a collective agreement. Once the contracting authority became 
aware of the fact that one of the subcontractors of the main contractor had infringed this obligation, 
it terminated the contract. This decision was challenged on the basis of EU free movement law and, 
after detailed analysis, the ECJ determined that the collective agreement at issue covered only a part 
of the construction sector falling within the geographical area of that agreement because it applied 
only to public contracts and not to private contracts, and the collective agreement had not been 
declared universally applicable. These two elements of the Rüffert Judgment are important because 
they led the ECJ to conclude that the requirement to pay that minimum wage in accordance with the 
collective agreement did not fix a rate of pay according to one of the procedures laid down in Art 3(1) 
and in Art 3(8) of the PWD. Consequently, the ECJ declared the requirement incompatible with EU 
law. Even if the Rüffert Judgment gave rise to significant criticism and left some legal uncertainties 
unsolved—notably, around the possibilities of establishing procurement-specific pay rules that did not 
apply to private contracts—it seemed clear that the ECJ aimed to align EU procurement and EU labour 
law, to the effect of enshrining the PWD as the single benchmark of legality for pay-related 
requirements. 
Subsequent guidance by the European Commission76 stressed this link by indicating that the 
relevant EU public procurement rules make it clear that the laws, regulations and collective 
agreements, at both national and EU level, which are in force in the areas of employment conditions 
and safety at work apply during performance of a public contract, providing such rules, and the way 
they are applied, comply with EU law.77 And, more specifically, the Commission stressed that one 
example of such compliance with EU law is the need to meet the requirements of the PWD in public 
procurement involving cross-border situations, where workers from one Member State provide 
services in another Member State for the purpose of performing a public contract.78 This approach is 
currently reflected in recital (98) of Directive 2014/24/EU, according to which 
It is essential that … contract performance conditions concerning social aspects … should be app lied in 
accordance with [the PWD], as interpreted by the [ECJ] and should not be chosen or applied in a way 
that discriminates directly or indirectly against economic operators from other Member States or from 
third countries parties to the [World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement] or to 
                                                          
74 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services [1996] OJ L 18/1. For criticism of this approach, 
see C McCrudden, ‘The Rüffert Case and Public Procurement’ in M Cremona (ed), Market Integration and Public 
Services in the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2011) 117-148. 
75 See Art 3(1) PWD, with Art 3(8) defining universal applicability as that of collective agreements that “must be 
observed by all undertakings in the geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned”. 
76 “Buying Social” (n 5). 
77 This guidance was issued in relation to the now repealed Directive 2004/18/EC. However, this is equally 
relevant in relation to the new generation of EU public procurement directives, including Directive 2014/24/EU. 
See recital 37 of Directive 2014/24/EU. 
78 “Buying Social” (n 5) 46, fn 86. 
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Free Trade Agreements to which the Union is party. Thus, requirements concerning the basic working 
conditions regulated in [the PWD], such as minimum rates of pay, should remain at the level set by 
national legislation or by collective agreements applied in accordance with Union law in the context of 
that Directive. 
Remarkably, though, the extent to which ‘autonomous’ public procurement requirements 
also applied to the imposition of (minimum) wage conditions through contract compliance clauses—
such as the need for them to be linked to the subject matter of the tendered contract79—and the 
contours of the limitations derived from the PWD remained somewhat unclear. This led to subsequent 
litigation that challenged some interpretations of Rüffert and, in particular, to the recent Judgment in 
RegioPost.80 In RegioPost, the contracting authority included the same material requirement that had 
been assessed in Rüffert—ie the obligation to pay the workers employed to execute the public 
contract the minimum wage applicable to the place of provision of the services. However, there was 
an important legal difference in this case because the relevant minimum wage had been determined 
by a regional law applicable only to the execution of public contracts. Thus, the case raised some 
difficulties around its compatibility with Rüffert in that, on the one hand, the imposition of the 
minimum wage by the regional law did fit the formal requirements of the PWD (as Art 3(1) explicitly 
covers measures adopted by law) but, on the other hand, the requirement was potentially in conflict 
with Rüffert because the regional law applied to public but not to private contracts. The latter issue 
seemed to have particular relevance because it had been recently reiterated in Bundesdruckerei, in 
relation with another German regional law mandating minimum wage for the execution of public 
contracts only, where the ECJ stressed that “in so far as it applies solely to public contracts, such a 
national measure is not appropriate for achieving that objective if there is no information to suggest 
that employees working in the private sector are not in need of the same wage protection as those 
working in the context of public contracts”.81  
Ultimately, however, the ECJ allowed for the imposition of minimum wage82 requirements as 
special performance conditions in contracts covered by the EU public procurement rules where that 
minimum wage derives from regional legislation—even if that only applies to public contracts—
because the condition as to universal application defined in the first subparagraph of Art 3(8) of the 
PWD applies only to the collective agreements or arbitration awards, but not to the other measures 
listed in Art 3(1) of that directive.83 Thus, it seems clear that the analysis remains focused on 
compliance with the PWD, and that issues of discrimination between workers employed to execute 
private and public contracts did not enter the analysis of the ECJ as it would if the requirement for 
                                                          
79 This was a debatable question under Art 26 Dir 2004/18/EC, given its silence, but there were good reasons to 
consider the need for contract compliance requirements to be linked to the subject matter of the contract; see 
A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart, 2011) 317. This is now clearly 
a requirement under Art 70 Dir 2014/24/EU, which explicitly establishes that ‘Contracting authorities may lay 
down special conditions relating to the performance of a contract, provided that they are linked to the subject-
matter of the contract …’; see Sanchez-Graells (n 64) 390. See also Semple (n 67). 
80 RegioPost, C-115/14, EU:C:2015:760. 
81 Judgment in Bundesdruckerei EU:C:2014:2235, para [32]. 
82 It remains unclear whether the imposition of wage requirements (such as a living wage) above a lower 
generally applicable minimum wage would be allowed; see Judgment in RegioPost EU:C:2015:760, para [76], 
where the ECJ refers to the fact that, at the time when the minimum wage was imposed by the regional law, it 
conferred “a minimum social protection since … the [applicable legislation] did not impose, nor did other national 
legislation impose, a lower minimum wage for the [relevant economic] sector”. 
83 Judgment in RegioPost EU:C:2015:760, para [63]. 
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universal application had not been assessed in the strict terms of Art 3(8) PWD.84 The substantive 
contradiction between Bundesdruckerei and RegioPost thus seems to be formally saved by the explicit 
terms of the PWD where applicable (ie in RegioPost but not in Bundesdruckerei), which is not a 
satisfactory position in terms of meaningful systemic integrity of the rules applicable to public 
procurement and the enforcement of labour standards in the internal market—it does save the 
underlying difficulties in terms of competence allocation, but it creates significant uncertainty in 
situations where the applicability of the PWD is not straightforward.85 
Compatible with the approach of concentrating the analysis of the imposition of labour 
standards through contract compliance clauses on the requirements of the PWD, the ECJ Judgment in 
Bundesdruckerei also established that, if a service can be provided from a different Member State—
ie where there is no posting of workers—it is against EU law to impose minimum wage requirements 
that apply across the board, ie regardless of the Member State where performance of the service takes 
place. As clearly put by the ECJ 
a fixed minimum wage corresponding to that required in order to ensure reasonable remuneration for 
employees in the Member State of the contracting authority in the light of the cost of living in that 
Member State, but which bears no relation to the cost of living in the Member State in which the services 
relating to the public contract at issue are performed and for that reason prevents [economic 
operators] established in that Member State from deriving a competitive advantage from the 
differences between the respective rates of pay … [and] goes beyond what is necessary to ensure that 
the objective of employee protection is attained.86 
This is important because the Bundesdruckerei Judgment suggests that, other than in 
compliance with the PWD—which allows for procurement-specific minimum wage requirements 
when they are laid down by law, regulation or administrative provision, but not when they are laid 
down by collective agreement, unless declared universally applicable87—the rules in the EU public 
procurement directives are insufficient to provide legal cover to minimum wage requirements due to 
the restrictions they create on free movement.88 
However, despite the guidance in this line of case law, the interaction between the PWD and 
the rules on contract compliance clauses in the public procurement directives remains somewhat 
unclear. In one reading, given that the wage requirements included in the Rüffert, Bundesdruckerei 
and RegioPost cases were assessed against the standard of the PWD, it can be concluded that Art 26 
of Directive 2004/18/EC, and now Art 70 of Directive 2014/24/EU do not provide sufficient legal basis 
for contracting authorities to create minimum wage requirements that actually go beyond those 
already derived from existing rules adopted in conformity with the PWD. I consider this the better 
                                                          
84 Similarly, see Costamagna (n 14) 107-108; and, for further discussion, C Kilpatrick, Internal Market Architecture 
and the Accommodation of Labour Rights: As Good as it Gets?, EUI LAW Working Paper 2011/04, available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1814/16824.  
85 For a well-argued criticism of this approach, see Costamagna (n 14) 109-110. This is also discussed in more 
detail in A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Competition and State aid implications of ‘public’ minimum wage clauses in EU 
public procurement after the RegioPost Judgment’, in A Sanchez-Graells (ed), Smart Public Procurement and 
Labour Standards—Pushing the Discussion after RegioPost (Bloomsbury-Hart, forthc.), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958296. 
86 Judgment in Bundesdruckerei EU:C:2014:2235, para [34], emphasis added. 
87 Which now seems impossible on the basis of Rüffert’s and RegioPost’s interpretation that compliance with Art 
3(8) PWD is excluded where the collective agreement applies to public but not private contracts. 
88 A controversial issue pending adjudication concerns the establishment of minimum wage or other labour law 
requirements by administrative provision not universally applicable, which can be very problematic if the 
inclusion of the requirement in the tender documentation is in itself constructed as a valid administrative 
provision for the purposes of Art 3(1) PWD. 
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position, in particular due to the need to ensure systematic consistency in the field of EU economic 
law. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that there is an alternative reading based on RegioPost 
that can create scope for divergence from this position.  
In that regard, it is worth noting that the ECJ indicated that “since the national measure 
[imposing minimum wage] falls within the scope of Article 26 of Directive 2004/18, which permits, 
subject to certain conditions, the imposition of a minimum wage in public contracts, that measure 
cannot be required to extend beyond that specific field by applying generally to all contracts, including 
private contracts. The limitation of the scope of the national measure to public contracts is the simple 
consequence of the fact that there are rules of EU law specific to that field, in this case, those laid down 
in Directive 2004/18”.89 This could be seen as effectively pointing out to the rules in the procurement 
Directives as allowing something that goes beyond the PWD. However, in my view, this is not the case 
because the ECJ had already concluded that, under the PWD itself, there is no requirement for 
universal applicability of national measures other than for collective agreements or arbitration 
awards. Moreover, this is clear from the way the ECJ completed the reasoning on the interaction of 
the PWD and the procurement rules, by indicating that “Article 26 of Directive 2004/18, read in 
conjunction with [the PWD], permits the host Member State to lay down, in the context of the award 
of a public contract, a mandatory rule for minimum protection referred to in point (c) of the first 
subparagraph of Article 3(1) of that directive … which requires undertakings established in other 
Member States to comply with an obligation in respect of a minimum rate of pay for the benefit of 
their workers posted to the territory of the host Member State in order to perform that public contract. 
Such a rule is part of the level of protection which must be guaranteed to those workers”.90 In my 
opinion, this conclusion is in line with the general criterion that the analysis of pay-related 
requirements in the area of public procurement remains focused on compliance with the PWD.91 
Therefore, I submit that a proper interpretation of Art 70 of Directive 2014/24/EU in relation 
to the PWD demonstrates that the public procurement rules do not contain a substantive standard 
that allows Member States and their contracting authorities to use contract compliance clauses to go 
beyond existing employment and labour rules. Ultimately, then, the procurement-specific measures 
oriented towards imposing labour standards will have to be enacted in compliance with the PWD, 
where applicable, and otherwise be compatible with an analysis of proportionality under the general 
free movement rules. Moreover, contract compliance clauses will have to be linked to the subject 
matter of the contract, which creates a further restriction to the use of this mechanism top go beyond 
existing rules. 
 
Potential contribution of procurement mechanisms to the enforcement  
of labour standards in the EU 
The previous analysis lends itself to the core conclusion that the success of the inclusion of pro-labour 
standards mechanisms in Directive 2014/24/EU as a result of the trend of regulatory substitution that 
has pushed for a reorientation of EU public procurement towards the facilitation of employment and 
labour goals is both limited and highly dependent on the implementation (and investment of 
significant administrative resources) at Member State level. 
                                                          
89 Judgment in RegioPost EU:C:2015:760, paras [64] and [65]. 
90 Judgment in RegioPost EU:C:2015:760, para [66]. 
91 This can be criticised for different reasons and from different perspectives. I find the likely distortions of 
competition that this can create particularly troubling, as discussed in detail in Sanchez-Graells (n 84). 
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First, the inclusion of positive mechanisms in the form of contract compliance clauses (Art 70 
Dir 2014/24) is severely restricted by the double requirement of compliance with general EU law and 
with the procurement-specific requirement of their link to the subject matter of the contract. In the 
specific case of the use of contract compliance clauses to impose minimum wage requirements, the 
coordination of the public procurement rules with general EU labour law (specifically, the PWD) has 
shown that regulatory substitution has not actually taken place, and that the internal market logic of 
both sets of rules prevent the advancement of labour law regulation by means of public procurement, 
despite repeated efforts in that regard. I submit that, ultimately, only one substantive standard applies 
to the use of contract compliance clauses for wage-related requirements—that of free movement, as 
concretised by the PWD where applicable—which may fall short from insulating public procurement 
from the pressure for it to assimilate extraneous regulatory goals, but does significantly constrain what 
can legally be done in this area. As mentioned above, the PWD only allows for procurement-specific 
minimum wage requirements when they are laid down by law, regulation or administrative provision, 
but not when they are laid down by collective agreement, unless declared universally applicable.  
There are two open issues. One, whether non-minimum wage requirements are allowed, in 
the sense of whether requirements can be imposed that go beyond (statutory) minimum wages. This 
can have an important impact by restricting living wage and other ‘public-sector’ minimum wage 
requirements that go beyond generally applicable minimum wage legislation—which would take place 
on the basis that Member States are only allowed to regulate an absolute wage floor, and that 
procurement mechanisms can only impose that minimum requirement but not one that exceeds it. 
And two, how to draw the boundaries of ‘administrative provisions’ for the purposes of Art 3(1) PWD 
in order to avoid situations that could take the exemption from the requirement of universal 
applicability too far (such as if the tender documentation was considered an acceptable administrative 
provision for the purposes of the PWD, which I submit would be excessively permissive). In my view, 
both elements should (and are likely) to be interpreted in a restrictive manner, which can further 
contribute to narrow down the scope for wage-related contract compliance requirements. Beyond 
this, the requirement for the link to the subject matter of the contract will remain an important 
constraint (particularly where a single employer cannot discriminate between employees in its work 
force depending on whether they engage in the execution of public contracts or not, or where staff 
are employed for the execution of contracts from time to time but not permanently, which raises 
issues around the ways in which their wages should fluctuate). The general requirement to comply 
with EU internal market law will also be a constraint for non-wage labour and employment-related 
contract compliance requirements, as they are likely to constitute barriers to trade that fail a strict 
proportionality assessment in terms of the Bundesdruckerei test. 
This is not to say that labour standards cannot (much less that they shall not) be enforced in 
the area of public procurement, but rather that they are (and can only be) enforced to the same extent 
as in any other sector of the economy, and only in compliance with rules of general application 
compatible with EU law. In my view, this seems appropriate because it tends to constrain the issues 
of policy conflation and loss of policy effectiveness in the area of procurement that could otherwise 
arise—which are roughly of the same type as those created by negative mechanisms (discussed 
below). Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that the use of positive procurement mechanisms in 
the form of contract compliance clauses for the enforcement of labour standards creates a layer of 
regulatory burden likely to only achieve limited practical results, if any, and that the expectations 
placed on this strategy may be overblown. Thus, there are good reasons to abandon the rhetoric 
underlying the efforts or push for regulatory substitution in this area, so that public bodies do not 
operate under the illusion that this will boost labour protections and, in turn, undertakings need not 
waste their time wriggling around, trying to find gaps in the over-regulation from which to try to derive 
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a competitive advantage. Departing from the current instrumental approach to contract compliance 
clauses for the enforcement of labour standards will also reduce the legal uncertainty in this area, 
which would bring immediate benefits in itself. 
Second, and in a somewhat contrasting fashion, the reforms concerning negative pro-labour 
standards mechanisms for the exclusion of tenderers or tenders that do not comply with applicable 
labour and employment obligations (Arts 18(2), 56, 57 & 69 Dr 2014/24) have been more successful 
in terms of regulatory substitution, and have now become part and parcel of public procurement 
regulated by the 2014 EU Package. Some aspects of this regulatory substitution implicitly rely on 
previous findings of breach of relevant social and employment legislation, and these aspects are 
unlikely to generate significant distortions of the procurement process—eg the exclusion of a tenderer 
that has been previously convicted by final judgment for the infringement of health and safety rules. 
However, other aspects create an independent duty to investigate (or the discretion to investigate, 
which can then prompt a duty, either under general principles of administrative law or on the back of 
a challenge by tenderers92) and are likely to create disruptions in the conduct of procurement 
procedures. 
This regulatory reform has effectively transferred (or multiplied) inspection and audit burdens 
in public procurement (without necessarily having reduced those same burdens in the employment 
and labour arena), and more than probably placed procuring entities under significant strain by 
creating the expectation that they will (effectively) monitor compliance with social and labour law 
established by Union law, national law, collective agreements or by a number of relevant ILO 
Conventions. In countries where there is a separate enforcement architecture in charge of monitoring 
(and sanctioning) breaches of social and employment rules (ie labour inspectorates, such as those 
existing in Denmark, Germany, Italy or Spain, to name only a few EU jurisdictions),93 rather than 
regulatory substitution, this will create regulatory duplication. This will not necessarily only create 
issues of coordination and resource allocation, but can also raise issues of complacency or priority 
distraction, provide excuses not to take other types of enforcement measures, and ultimately 
encroach regulatory discrimination between workers in public sector facing industries and 
elsewhere.94 Differently, in countries where such enforcement architecture does not exist (ie where 
there has been an effective regulatory substitution as an attempt to create some sort of labour and 
employment enforcement structure), this will result in an additional strain of the resources dedicated 
to the administration of public procurement, as well as a false sense of sufficiency of these 
mechanisms to oversee compliance with employment and social law more generally. Put in simple 
terms, procurement compliance and oversight can be no substitute for other enforcement 
mechanisms. 
In both cases, this regulatory substitution (or duplication) raises questions around its 
effectiveness95 because it is not clear that procuring entities are in a position to monitor compliance 
                                                          
92 In that regard, concerning the justiciability of exclusion grounds, see Judgment of 5 April 2017 in Marina del 
Mediterráneo and Others, C-391/15, EU:C:2017:268. See also Sanchez-Graells (n 65) for extended discussion. 
93 For more details of the existence of labour inspectorates in European jurisdictions, see SYNDEX-EPSU, A 
mapping report on Labour Inspection Services in 15 European countries (2012), available at 
http://www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/EPSU_Final_report_on_Labour_Inspection_Services.pdf. 
More generally, see ILO, Figures and Statistics on Labour Inspection Systems (2010), available at 
http://ilo.org/labadmin/info/WCMS_141079/lang--en/index.htm.  
94 For a compelling account of these issues in the Australian context: Holley, Maconachie and Goodwin (n 4). 
95 Generally, on the unlikely effectiveness of the use of procurement to enforce similar policies, such as SME 
participation, see S Evenett and B Hoekman, ‘International Disciplines on Government Procurement’, in A 
Lukauskas, R Stern and G Zanini (eds), Handbook of Trade Policy for Development (Oxford University Press, 2013) 
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with Art 18(2) obligations in a satisfactory manner. Some aspects of this additional burden linked to 
the tenderers can be hedged or mitigated by the creation of centralised registration systems entrusted 
with monitoring compliance—although this will require the investment of significant resources in 
countries where such systems do not exist, or where they need to be significantly reformed. However, 
other aspects directly linked to the each of the tenders will raise tender evaluation costs and possibly 
litigation, without necessarily resulting in higher levels of compliance with labour or employment 
standards more generally. This can have a disproportionate effect for some smaller scale procuring 
entities, as well as for all procuring entities when carrying out relatively low-value procurement. 
Overall, it seems that despite the rhetoric surrounding the legislative process leading to the 
adoption of Directive 2014/24/EU and current formulation of EU policy, procurement mechanisms 
have limited potential to contribute to the enforcement of labour standards in the EU. I am aware that 
such rhetoric and strategic couching in smart procurement terms may trigger de facto non-compliance 
with the restrictions on the use of positive mechanisms—which may go unchecked due to commercial 
reasons—and that Member States may actually decide to invest significant amounts of resource in 
making the negative mechanisms discussed above work out (not least because they are common to 
the pursuit of other exclusion grounds that are core to procurement regulation). However, I do not 
think that those are good enough reasons to reject the legal analysis carried out here. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have shown how the review of the EU public procurement rules through the 2014 
Package has galvanised a trend of regulatory substitution whereby employment and social goals have 
now become part and parcel of public procurement strategy in the EU. However, a close examination 
of the legal mechanisms created by Directive 2014/24/EU has also shown that this regulatory 
substitution is both limited and highly dependent on the implementation (and investment of 
significant administrative resources) at Member State level.  
Negative mechanisms oriented towards the exclusion of tenderers and tenders that are 
shown to breach relevant social and employment obligations are legally defined in a way that fits the 
conduct of procurement procedures, but also in a way that raises the administrative burden without 
necessarily providing proportionate benefits—which remains an empirical question. They are also 
created in ways that generate legal uncertainty and that are likely to result in fresh litigation in view 
of recent ECJ case law on the justiciability of exclusion grounds. Moreover, even if implemented in an 
effective manner, these mechanisms are no substitute for more general systems of enforcement of 
social and employment law, and this creates structural issues of coordination and allocation of 
resources.  
Positive mechanisms aimed at the creation of contract compliance clauses imposing social or 
employment-related conditions (and in particular, minimum wage requirements) are more limited 
than they would seem at first reading. They are constrained by the cumulative applicability of EU 
public procurement and EU labour law, which results in the double requirement of compliance with 
the PWD and of keeping a close link with the subject matter of the contract, and are in any case subject 
                                                          
851-876; and B Hoekman, ‘International Cooperation on Public Procurement Regulation’, in A Georgopoulos, B 
Hoekman & P C Mavroidis (eds), The Internationalization of Government Procurement Regulation (Oxford 
University Press, 2017) 568-602. 
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to a strict proportionality analysis under general EU free movement law where the PWD (or other 
sectoral regulation) does not apply. 
In my view, these conclusions can be useful not only in EU jurisdictions—where 
implementation decisions will have to aim to support the use of negative mechanisms through 
adequate resourcing, and provide guidance on the legally compliant limited ways in which contract 
compliance requirements can be contractualised—but also elsewhere. Issues surrounding negative 
mechanisms and their impact on the regulatory burden of carrying out procurement will be a common 
restriction of this instrumental use of public procurement. Issues surrounding positive mechanisms, 
or labour regulation through public contract, may be different in the absence of a market integration 
norm. However, there will be common issues concerning discrimination of workers engaged in the 
execution of public and private contracts, as well as other issues concerning limited competition for 
public contracts and the shadow cost this creates for the public purse. 
Therefore, on the whole, the analysis in this paper supports a change of tack and a move away 
from the instrumentalisation of public procurement for the enforcement of labour standards, and 
back to its core function. However, the extent to which this is likely to happen might as well be limited, 
for public procurement is and will likely remain a regulatory garbage can. 
